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This chapter explores Gregory’s metaphysics of the Trinity, which used an 
innovative distinction between stuffs (e.g. gold), which cannot be counted, and 
individuals (e.g. rings), which can. Gregory identifies the nature of any kind with 
the totality of its instances: the nature of man is the totality of men; the nature 
of gold is the totality of gold. For Gregory, the totality is more ‘real’ than the 
individuals into which it is articulated, which are merely the way in which the 
kind is present in the world. God is then identified as the total quantity of 
divinity in the world, and is thus one, and real. The Persons of the Trinity into 
which God is articulated are the ways God is in the world, and can be 
comprehended by us. Thus, the problem of the Trinity is solved as a special case 
of the philosophical problem of the One and Many.
Keywords:   God, Trinity, stuff, individuals, count principles, principles of individuation
The metaphysical question that the doctrine of the Trinity in its most abstract 
formulation raises is this: how can one thing be many too?1 Let us call it for 
brevity the One and Many problem. The Trinity is not its only instance. The 
conundrum was already prominent in philosophy before it became also of 
theological importance in early Christian thought. Given a number of elements, 
their composition into a whole generates another version of the same question: a 
whole is its parts; but isn’t the whole one and its parts many? What is the 
relation between the parts and the whole they compose? At one extreme of the 
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spectrum of philosophical answers is the view that wholes are nothing over and 
above the sum of their parts; so, the whole is many (in the way in which e.g. a 
bundle of sticks is the sticks that compose it). On the other extreme of the 
spectrum is the view that a whole is one, because it has no actual parts, even if 
it is derived from the composition of parts: the component parts cease to exist as 
such in the whole (in the way in which eggs, butter, sugar etc. qua ingredients of 
a cake are not to be found as such in the cake). On the former view, the One and 
Many problem is solved by sacrificing the oneness of the whole, and on the latter 
by sacrificing the multiplicity of the parts.
There are also other versions of the One and Many problem in the philosophical 
literature; for instance the case of entities which are numerically one, and 
simple in nature, and yet bear properties which introduce complexity. Plato’s 
Ideas are suchlike entities: each of them is monoeides (i.e. all there is to  (p.221)
its nature is the kind of character in the world the Idea stands for);2 and yet 
Ideas bear further qualities (e.g. they are eternal). How can an Idea be a single 
kind, and also of many kinds, on account of the properties that belong to it? The 
problem was left open in Plato’s metaphysics. A further version of the One and 
Many problem is generated by the issue of the instantiation of a universal; for 
example, the distribution of each of Plato’s Ideas: there is an unique Idea for 
each kind of character in the world, and yet, the character recurs simultaneously 
in many individuals. Aristotle’s forms are also one per type of character in the 
world, but each form is simultaneously present in many particulars.
The case of the Trinity is at least as challenging a version of One and Many 
problem as its precedents found in the history of classical (pagan) philosophy. 
What makes the case of the Trinity distinctive, and philosophically difficult to 
account for, is that Christian orthodoxy claims that there is a single God, without 
thereby wanting to deny the status of divine individuals to each of the Persons of 
the Trinity. Let us call this doctrinal stance (D) for brevity. (D) makes the 
problem of the Trinity different from pre-Christian versions of the One and Many 
problem, and in particular from the problem of the instantiation of universal, 
because the three person of the Trinity are all of the same ontological status, 
and are not differentiated into type and tokens. (D) also blocks a move that 
ancient and modern metaphysicians alike would find natural to make in 
accounting for the Trinity. The move in question would be to understand the 
relation between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit on the one hand, and 
God on the other, in terms of emergence. Aristotle had introduced emergence in 
the history of metaphysics in book XVII of his Metaphysics, with the example of a 
syllable and its constituent letters;3 so we can plausibly assume that it would 
have been a metaphysical tool available to the thinkers of the Christian era. In 
very general terms, the idea is that composition can give rise to an emergent 
novel entity, with novel properties with respect to those of its constituents. The 
important and relevant feature of emergence with respect to the problem of the 
Trinity is that an emergent entity can be of the same type as the entities from 
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whose composition it emerges (as for instance in the case of a cube made of 
cubes). So, positing that the Trinity is an emergent entity would respect (D) 
insofar as the Trinity would have metaphysical novelty with respect to the  (p.
222) three Persons, but would also be an entity of the same kind. The reason 
why thinking of the Trinity in terms of emergence is not however viable (on 
account of (D)) is that the components of an emergent entity lose their 
individuality and distinctness at the emergent level; this is the price to pay for 
the genuine metaphysical novelty of what emerges. But the divine Persons 
making up the Trinity cannot lose their status as individuals; they are three 
Persons. Therefore emergence cannot give us a model for understanding the 
metaphysics of the Trinity.
In this chapter I will examine an original account of the Trinity that displays 
much philosophical ingenuity in the effort of meeting (D)’s requirements. This is 
the account that the Church Father Gregory of Nyssa offers in his Letter to 
Ablabius.4 I will argue that Gregory addresses the Trinity as a philosophical 
problem; to solve it, he draws eclectically on philosophical ideas developed by 
his pagan predecessors Plato and Aristotle, adding also original ideas of his own. 
The resulting account is innovative and, I submit, sound, in the sense that it 
justifies both the oneness and the threeness of God.
Gregory of Nyssa’s Metaphysical Account of the Trinity
Gregory’s Letter to Ablabius is a dialectical piece, aimed to rebut non-orthodox 
views on the Trinity.5 Such erroneous views are, on the one hand, that there are 
three Gods, and on the other, that not all of the Persons are God. Gregory writes 
that,
we are at first sight compelled to accept one or other of two erroneous 
opinions, and either to say there are three Gods, which is unlawful, or not 
to acknowledge the Godhead of the Son and the Holy Spirit, which is 
impious and absurd.6
 (p.223) Since, by doctrine, God is one, the divine status of the three Persons 
must not undermine the numerical oneness of God. Nor should the oneness of 
God undermine the divine status of each of the Three Persons. There is one God 
and each of the three Persons is God. In his Letter to Ablabius Gregory 
undertakes to give a philosophical account of this claim. His approach is to begin 
with an example from everyday life, of an entity that is one and many, where 
(like in the case of the Trinity) oneness and multiplicity do not ‘interfere’ with 
each other. The familiarity of the example Gregory offers should not mislead us 
into thinking that finding such an example is an easy matter. His example is that 
of a lump of gold which is cut into coins—from this example he will develop a 
novel and general metaphysical theory whose significance goes beyond the 
original theological problem of the Trinity. Let us turn to examine Gregory’s 
treatment of the example:
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For we say that gold, even though it be cut into many figures, is one, and is 
so spoken of; but we speak of many coins or many staters, without finding 
any multiplication of the nature of gold by the number of staters.7
One may well ask the question: gold is one what? With hindsight, and twentieth-
century philosophical terminology, we can answer that the gold is one quantity of 
matter, and remains the same (quantity of matter) even if cut into coins.8 The 
term ‘quantity of matter’ in the specific sense I am using it here was introduced 
by Helen Cartwright in the 1970s, to designate what is common for example 
between a golden ring and the earrings it may be moulded into: what is common 
is the quantity of gold involved. The important point for our purposes is that, as 
Cartwright observed,
‘gold’ [taken as an example of quantity of matter] does not provide an 
arithmetic for those things to which it applies and, trivially, neither does 
any other mass noun; ‘one,’ ‘two,’ ‘how many…’ are ruled out 
grammatically.9
Surprisingly, Gregory makes, explicitly, the same point. He does not use our 
terminology, but he has thoroughly grasped the concept of quantity of matter. He 
writes that,
for this reason we speak of gold, when it is contemplated in greater bulk, 
either in plate or in coin, as much, but we do not speak of it as many golds 
on account of the multitude of the material.10
 (p.224) I submit that Gregory has identified ‘gold’ as a mass-term, referring to 
a mass that follows the arithmetic of quantities (and correspondingly is qualified 
as ‘much’ and ‘less’). Generalizing from the example, what Gregory has 
discovered is that some entities are individuated as masses and some entities are 
individuated as individuals. The difference between them is that individuals 
come with a count principle, given by their sortal description, which allows one 
to count how many they are (e.g. so many books in a room). Masses, on the other 
hand, do not come with a count principle, and hence cannot be counted 
(accordingly we talk of some, much or little (e.g.) water in a glass). If, then, a 
quantity of gold is cut up into coins, this does not change its number. It can’t, 
because count principles do not apply to masses. Gregory even gestures to 
linguistic considerations to show that it is not the quantity of gold that becomes 
many, but the coins cut out from it. He writes that,
when one says there are many gold pieces (Darics, for instance, or staters), 
[…] it is not the material, but the pieces of money to which the significance 
of number applies: indeed, properly, we should not call them gold but 
golden.11
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Darics or staters are individuated as (golden) coins; they are not quantities of 
gold, which is why the number that accrues to them, qua coins, does not accrue 
to the quantity of gold out which they are made. Gregory uses this observation 
about individuation to develop a theory about the natures of things. It is 
plausible to think that in making this conceptual transition, from quantity of 
(e.g.) gold, to the nature of golden items, Gregory is leaning on a passage in 
Plato’s Timaeus. There Plato writes,
Suppose you were moulding gold into every shape there is, going on non-
stop remoulding one shape into the next. If someone then were to point at 
one of them and ask you, ‘What is it?’ then, your safest answer by far, with 
respect to truth, would be to say, ‘gold,’ but never ‘triangle’ or any of the 
other shapes which come to be in the gold, as though it is these, because 
they change even while you’re making the statement.12
 (p.225) Plato’s argument is this: since the material an object is made of 
survives the object’s changes (of shape, and function we can add), it is the 
material that reveals the nature of the object, namely what each of these things 
of different shapes and functions is. Thus, in the example gold is the nature that 
stays the same, while the shapes (and functions) it takes on are transient and 
ephemeral.13 Plato proceeds to offer an explanation for why gold is what 
survives, and thus is the nature of the golden things in question. He writes,
Now the same account, in fact, holds also for that nature14 which receives 
all the bodies. We must always refer to it by the same term, for it does not 
depart form its own character in any way. Not only does it always receive 
all things, it has never in any way whatever taken on any characteristic
similar to any of the things that enter it. These are the things that make it 
appear different at different times.15
We now see that there is a reason why gold survives transformations. A quantity 
of gold is not circular; while a ring is—as Helen Cartwright observes in the 
passage quoted above. But what a ring really is, is gold; and thus gold is the real 
subject of properties such as being circular. As a subject however, gold bears 
such properties; but it is not changed by them. This is an important 
metaphysical distinction Plato draws (but does not articulate) in the Timaeus, 
between different ways properties may belong to something.16 So, on account of 
the fact that properties such as shape belong to the golden object and to gold 
differently, gold survives unchanged through acquiring and losing (e.g.) certain 
shapes; it is only the object made out of gold that changes. This is the key to 
understanding why gold, in Plato’s and in Gregory’s examples, is the nature of 
(golden) things: it is because gold survives through the changes affecting golden 
things.17
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To recapitulate my argument so far: the important idea that Gregory derives 
from Plato’s Timaeus is that a certain quantity of gold—this gold—is both 
qualitatively one (it is gold) and numerically one (it remains the same quantity 
(p.226) of gold throughout transformations). Gregory’s argument for this 
(Platonic) position, as we will see, is new and not to be found in Plato; it 
complements Plato’s stance in two ways: with the distinction between masses 
and individuals and the insight that properties belong to a mass and to an 
individual differently; and with the idea that a different arithmetic applies to 
masses (i.e. natures, like gold) and individuals (e.g. coins). The result is a 
distinctive contribution of Gregory’s to the history of metaphysics. Now, what is 
most relevant to our present concerns is that mass-arithmetic applies to masses 
(e.g. much gold), and count-arithmetic to individuals (e.g. many golden coins). 
The plurality of the artefacts that are generated by, e.g., the coin-shape does not 
‘transfer’ to the quantity of gold the artefacts are made from. That is, the 
articulation and the reshaping into artefacts leaves the original quantity of gold 
unaffected. Gregory is explicit about this point, and states it repeatedly in the 
last quotation above. On this insight Gregory will build his account of the Trinity.
So far I have been arguing for a very significant connection between Plato’s 
views in the Timaeus and Gregory’s thought. But as I anticipated in the 
introduction to this chapter, Gregory, aware of the fact that the Trinity is a 
distinctive case of what I called the One and Many problem, doesn’t follow 
completely either Plato or Aristotle in addressing it, but develops his own theory, 
using elements from both his predecessors as well as original ideas of his own. 
One key notion the three philosophers share is that there are joints at which 
nature is to be carved; such joints of nature are the real being of things. But 
which are these? We saw that for Plato (at least in the Timaeus) that of the 
quantities of matter is the level at which we find nature’s joints, or real being. 
For, a quantity of matter, such as this gold, survives unaffected articulation and 
reshaping, e.g. into many coins. This for Plato reveals that the nature of an 
object—what the object really is—is its matter, i.e. gold. Aristotle on the other 
hand, uses the (same, Platonic) criterion of survival through change to identify 
(by contrast with Plato) the form of an object as its nature and principle of 
individuation, where the form, or essence of something, is the set of its surviving 
qualities or features. So real being for Aristotle is at the level of quality. Gregory 
combines ideas from Plato and Aristotle; for him, quantities of quality are the 
nature’s joints, or the real being of things.18
 (p.227) Furthermore, like Aristotle, Gregory posits two principles of 
individuation in his metaphysics. Aristotle’s two principles pick out, respectively, 
concrete particulars (e.g. Socrates), and their substantial form, or the form of 
the species (e.g. the form of man). Aristotle appears in his writings to have 
remained somewhat divided on which of the two principles yields ‘more real’ 
being.19 Gregory too posits two individuation principles, one for the natures of 
things (e.g. gold), and one for individuals (e.g. coins) which are individuated by 
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what he calls their ‘peculiar qualities’; with a different example, Gregory 
explains that,
the persons admits of that separation which is made by the peculiar 
attributes considered in each severally, and when they are combined [that 
separation] is presented to us by means of number […]20
As we saw, natures come with no count principles, whilst individuals do have 
count principles and their own arithmetic. But what is important for present 
purposes is that (unlike Aristotle’s) Gregory’s individuation criteria are not of 
the same standing with each other. The one that picks out natures, thereby picks 
out real being, the joints of reality we could say; whilst the latter picks out ways 
we get to know natures, in terms of individuals with their peculiar qualities.21
Gregory takes a further step, which follows from Plato’s position in the Timaeus, 
but which Plato, or his followers, never explicitly took. Gregory thinks that each 
individual concrete thing has a nature and is its nature, for example ‘Luke is a 
man’, where the ‘is’ expresses essential predication (and not identity).22 But he 
further extends the Platonic conception of natures of concrete individual things 
as quantities to all things. For him, even the nature of man qua species is a 
quantity of quality (i.e. humanity). So, not only the concrete individuals (like 
Peter and Luke, or the golden coins), but also the species (like man) are 
quantities of quality:23
 (p.228)
As, then, the golden staters are many, but the gold is one, so too those who 
are exhibited to us severally in the nature of man, as Peter, James, and 
John, are many, yet the man in them is one.24
Gregory develops the notion of the nature of man as quantity of humanity as 
follows. First, he states that the nature of man is common to the individual men, 
thus:
there are many who have shared in the nature [of man]—many disciples, 
say, or apostles, or martyrs—but the man in them all is one; since, as has 
been said, the term man does not belong to the nature of the individual as 
such, but to that which is common.25
Gregory’s claim, when saying that ‘the man in them all is one’, is that the nature 
of man in Luke is the same quantity of quality as the nature of man in Stephen, 
Mark, etc.26 There is an explicit indication in the text that Gregory is  (p.229) 
thinking of quantities, in the case of what is common among golden coins as well 
as among men. He writes that ‘…their [the individuals’] nature is one, […] not 
capable of increase by addition or of diminution by subtraction’.27 Gregory 
identifies this feature of natures, namely that they cannot increase or decrease—
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they remain unchanged in their quantity; and uses it to justify why the mass-
arithmetic of a quantity of (e.g.) gold is different from the count-arithmetic of 
(e.g.) the coins into which it is cut. The point Gregory had already made earlier 
in the Letter is that the quantity (and oneness) of gold in the world is 
independent of the articulation of that quantity into any number of golden coins. 
Similarly, the nature of man remains one independently of the number of men 
that participate in it:
according to true reasoning neither diminution nor increase attaches to 
any nature, when it is contemplated in a larger or smaller number. For it is 
only those things which are contemplated in their individual 
circumscription which are enumerated by way of addition. Now this 
circumscription is noted by bodily appearance, and size, and place, and 
difference in figure and colour [i.e. their peculiar qualities], and that which 
is contemplated apart from these conditions is free from the 
circumscription which is formed by such categories.28
What is contemplated apart from the articulation that individuates particulars is 
the total quantity of a certain quality. This is why such quantity is incapable of 
increase or diminution. Gregory continues with a direct comparison between the 
case of man and the case of gold; as we saw in a passage already quoted:
As, then, the golden staters are many, but the gold is one, so too those who 
are exhibited to us severally in the nature of man, as Peter, James, and 
John, are many, yet the man in them is one.29
 (p.230) The nature of man is the total quantity of humanity in the world, just as 
the nature of gold is the total quantity of gold in the world.30 The nature of man 
is in all men in the way that the quantity of gold in the world is in all the golden 
artefacts there are. This is why Gregory claims that the term ‘man’ does not 
describe the nature of an individual man, but only the nature of the man that is 
common to all men:
the man in them all is one; since, as has been said, the term man does not 
belong to the nature of the individual as such, but to that which is 
common.31
Generalizing, the nature of each kind of thing there is, is the total quantity of 
that kind. We can now understand the following remarks Gregory makes, in 
relation to both gold and man:
their nature is one, at union in itself, and an absolutely indivisible unit, […] 
but in essence being and continually remaining one, inseparable even 
though it appear in plurality, continuous, complete, and not divided with 
the individuals who participate in it.32
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Importantly, this is a description of the nature of man, but it also applies to the 
total quantity of gold and to the total quantity of any kind. The nature of man is, 
metaphysically, a quantity of quality, just like the nature of gold is the total 
quantity of it. It appears to be ‘separated’ into many individuals, namely the 
actual members of a species or a kind in nature; but it is in fact a ‘continuous’ 
quantity, and ‘complete’ as the total quantity of the corresponding kind.33  (p.
231) A natural way for us, metaphysicians of the twenty-first century, to 
conceptualize how Gregory thinks of the quantities of species and kinds, is as 
mereological fusions of the individuals in nature that belong to these species or 
kinds. W. V. O. Quine developed a conception of properties which might be 
thought comparable to how Gregory thinks of natures (although Quine did not
apply it to terms with count principles like man). Quine writes that ‘the mass 
substantive “red” in subject position [i.e. referring to the property of red] may 
be conceived as a singular term naming the scattered totality of red 
substance’.34 This scattered totality of red substance is a single distributed 
object, the property or nature of red, made up of all the objects in the world 
which are red. In Gregory’s example, the distributed object is the nature of man, 
made up by all the men in the world, each of whom is human, just as gold is a 
distributed object made up of all the golden coins there are. (It is important to 
note that the fusion of men is not a conception of the nature of man that would 
deliver a sortal concept for the individuation of men. Gregory’s conception of the 
fusion of men, like the fusion of red in Quine, captures the presence of a kind of 
condition in nature, in Gregory’s case, humanity. Yet, Gregory assumes that men 
are individuated as instances of a sortal, without telling us more.35)
Coming now to how Gregory applies the metaphysics he developed in the case of 
the nature of man to the Trinity, he writes that,
The Lord God is one Lord, even though the name of Godhead extends 
through the Holy Trinity. This I say according to the account we have given 
in the case of human nature, in which we have learned that it is improper 
to extend the name of the nature by the mark of plurality.36
The nature of man is one, even if the name ‘man’ extends through humanity. 
What we have learned in the case of the nature of man is that it is improper to 
extend the name of ‘man’ by pluralizing the name, because human nature is one, 
and its plurality isn’t more real than the plurality of the nature of gold in the 
golden coins. The nature of gold is the total quantity of gold in the world; the 
nature of man is the total quantity of humanity in the world; both as we saw are 
conceived as what we would call mereological fusions: the fusion of all golden 
objects in the world, and the fusion of all men, respectively. It follows that the 
nature of God is the total quantity of the divine, that is, all the Gods there are. 
Accordingly, it is as improper to extend the name ‘Godhead’ in the  (p.232) 
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plural (‘Gods’) to the Persons of the Trinity, as it is to extend the name ‘man’ in 
the plural (‘men’) to Luke, Mark, etc. Gregory writes that,
the word ‘God’ it [i.e. the Scripture] employs studiously in the singular 
form only, guarding against introducing the idea of different natures in the 
Divine essence by the plural signification of Gods.37
The Trinity is the single nature of the divine: God. The articulation into Persons 
as it is presented to our comprehension is based on the peculiar properties that 
characterize this single nature in relation to its causal origins:
one is the Cause, and another is of the Cause; and again in that which is of 
the Cause we recognize another distinction. For one is directly from the 
first Cause, and another by that which is directly from the first Cause; so 
that the attribute of being Only-begotten abides without doubt in the Son, 
and the interposition of the Son, while it guards His attribute of being 
Only-begotten, does not shut out the Spirit from His relation by way of 
nature to the Father.38
So, the difference in the causal origins between the Father and the Son and the 
Holy Spirit introduces articulation in the nature of the divine, and allows our 
apprehension of God. Such articulation of God into three Persons isn’t however 
more real, according to Gregory, than the division of the human nature into 
individual people and the division of gold into coins. He writes that,
Thus, since on the one hand the idea of cause differentiates [as a peculiar 
quality] the Persons of the Holy Trinity […] and since on the one hand the 
Divine nature is apprehended by every conception as unchangeable and 
undivided, for these reasons we properly declare the Godhead to be one, 
and God to be one, and employ in the singular all other names which 
express Divine attributes.39
There is therefore a single God, whose peculiar qualities articulate Him into 
three Persons in our apprehension. It remains now to address the question: why 
three Persons exactly? Gregory offers a justification for this number, when 
saying that:
 (p.233)
every operation which extends from God to the Creation […] has its origin 
from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is perfected in the 
Holy Spirit.40
Even if we are not given a detailed account of each of the three Persons’ 
distinctive operation (and of the connection between his peculiar properties and 
the operation that each is assigned), it is clear that the three operations are 
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different (‘issuing’, ‘bringing into operation’, and ‘perfecting’),41 but 
complementary and equally necessary for divine action.42 Gregory writes that,
the action of each concerning anything is not separate and peculiar, but 
whatever comes to pass, in reference either to the acts of His providence 
for us, or to the government and constitution of the universe, comes to 
pass by the action of the Three, yet what does come to pass is not three 
things.43
 (p.234) Conclusion
In his Letter to Ablabius Gregory of Nyssa approaches the doctrine of the Trinity 
as a variant of a problem that has engaged philosophers since antiquity: how can 
something be one and many? He looks back at the metaphysical solutions that 
his predecessors Plato and Aristotle had put forward, but he does not lean 
entirely on any of them. Rather, he correctly identifies what makes the Trinity a 
distinctive version of the One and Many problem, and develops an original 
solution for it, combining elements of Plato’s and Aristotle’s metaphysics. 
Gregory knows, from Plato’s and Aristotle’s metaphysics, that a universal (i.e. 
the nature of a kind) is one, while the instances of that kind are many. But this 
type of arithmetic of instantiation can not be put to use to account for the Trinity 
problem, because universals are not, themselves, concrete individuals in the 
world; so if God were a universal of which the Persons were instances, He would 
not be a concrete individual, and further, his instances would not be of the same 
ontological status as His, contrary to the doctrine. Gregory needs to innovate. In 
addressing the question of the Trinity, he makes two important contributions to 
the history of metaphysics in general. One concerns the distinction between the 
arithmetic of stuffs and of individuals; and one concerns the identification of the 
nature of each type of thing in the world with the totality of the presence of the 
kind in the world, namely, its membership. Thus, the nature of man is the totality 
of men in the world; the nature of gold is the totality of golden artefacts in the 
world. Applied to the Trinity, this theory enables Gregory to hold that the nature 
of God is one, and it is the total quantity of what is divine in the world. What is 
divine in the world are the Persons of the Trinity, who are three in our 
apprehension only, from the perspective of their differentiation by the peculiar 
qualities. Nevertheless, what is real is the nature of the divine, God.
Notes:
(1) Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the Universities of Oxford 
and Princeton, and at the Union Theological Seminary at Columbia University. I 
am very grateful for the helpful comments received on all these occasions.
(2) See e.g. Phaedo, 78b–84b for mention of the Forms as monoeides (at 78d5, 
80b2, and 83e2); the other occurrences are in the Symposium (211b1, 211e4); 
Theaetetus (205d1); Timaeus (59b2); and Republic (612a4).
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(3) ‘As regards that which is compounded out of something so that the whole is 
one—not like a heap, however, but like a syllable—the syllable is not its 
elements, ba is not the same as b and a…for when they are dissolved, the 
whole[s], i.e.… the syllable, no longer exists, but the elements of the syllable 
exist’ (1041b11–15).
(4) My goal here is to explore the philosophical ideas in the letter, but not to give 
a full exegesis of it, or a comprehensive account of Gregory’s views on the 
Trinity across all his writings.
(5) This letter is not very much discussed in the literature on Gregory of Nyssa; 
see among the most informative recent studies L. Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy: 
An Approach to Fourth-Century Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), ch. 14.
(6) Ad Ablabium quod non sint Tres Dei, ed. F. Mueller in Gregorii Nysseni 
Opera, III/1 (Leiden: Brill, 1958), 38.3–7 (PG 116–17); and elsewhere: ἀνάγκη 
[…] ἑνὶ πάντως τῶν ἀπεμφαινόντων συνενεχθῆναι κατὰ τὸν πρόχειρον νοῦν καὶ 
ἢ τρεῖς λέγειν θεούς, ὅπερ ἀθέμιτον, ἢ μὴ προσμαρτυρεῖν, τῷ υἱῷ καὶ τῷ 
πνεύματι τὴν θεότητα, ὅπερ ἀσεβές τε καὶ ἄτοπον. Ad Ablabium is cited 
according to page and line numbers.
(7) Ibid. 53.16–19 (PG 132); my emphasis ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸν χρυσόν φαμεν, κἂν εἰς 
πολλοὺς διακερματίζηται τύπους, ἕνα καὶ εἶναι καὶ λέγεσθαι· πολλὰ δὲ 
νομίσματα καὶ πολλοὺς στατῆρας ὀνομάζομεν, οὐδένα τῆς φύσεως ταῦ χρυσοῦ 
πλεονασμὸν ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν στατήρων εὑρίσκοντες.
(8) A quantity of matter remains the same if no matter is added to and 
subtracted from it; that its weight or amount doesn’t change is not relevant.
(9) H. Cartwright, ‘Quantities’, Philosophical Review 79.1 (1970): 3.
(10) Ad Ablabium, 53.20–2, p. 132: διὸ καὶ πολὺς ὁ χρυσὸς λέγεται, ὅταν ἐν ὄγκῳ 
πλείονι ἢ σκεύεσιν ἢ νομίσμασι θεωρῆται, πολλοὶ δὲ οἰ χρυσοὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος 
τῆς ὕλης οὐκ ὀνομάζονται. Note that Gregory does not have the equivalent of 
our term ‘quantity’, but he does use the term ‘bulk’ instead, to refer to the 
quantity of gold.
(11) Ibid. 53.22–54.1, p. 132: τις οὕτω λέγοι, χρυσοὺς πολλούς, ὡς τοὺς 
δαρεικοὺς ἢ τοὺς στατῆρας…οὐχ ἡ ὕλη ἀλλὰ τὰ κέρματα τὴν τοῦ πλήθους 
σημασία ἐδέξατο. κυρίως γὰρ ἔστιν οὐχὶ χρυσοὺς ἀλλὰ χρυσέους τούτους 
εἰπεῖν…
(12) Timaeus, 50a5–b4: εἰ γàρ πάντα τις σχήματα πλάσας ἐκ χρυσοῦ μηδὲν 
μεταπλάττων παύοιτο ἕκαστα εἰς ἅπαντα, δεικνύντος δή τινος αὐτῶν ἓν καὶ 
ἐρομένου τί ποτ’ ἔστι, μακρῷ πρός ἀλήθειαν ἀσφαλέστατον εἰπεῖν ὅτι χρυσός, 
τὸ δὲ τρίγωνον ὅσα τε ἄλλα σχήματα ἐνεγίνετο, μηδέποτε λέγειν ταῦτα ὡς 
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ὄντα, ἅ γε μεταξὺ τιθεμένου μεταπίπτει. In this passage Plato makes the 
distinction, which became subsequently mostly associated with Aristotle’s 
metaphysics, between being a this versus being such. Plato takes gold to be a 
this. He associates being a this with the survival of a mass-kind in change (e.g. 
this gold), whilst Aristotle associates being a this with the survival of a count-
kind in change (e.g. this man). Note that in the passage quoted above Plato 
claims that what the triangle really is, is gold; while Gregory would say that the 
tringle is golden, like the coins are golden rather than gold. This does not 
however amount to a divergence in their views on this point: one of Gregory’s 
examples in the Letter to Ablabius is that John is human, but he has the nature of 
man. I won’t examine the issue in further depth here, because a more detailed 
comparison between Plato’s and Gregory’s views would take us outside the 
scope of this chapter.
(13) It is interesting to note that for Plato at least in the Timaeus, the answer to 
the ‘what is it?’ question is not given by the organization or the function of an 
object, as Aristotle would have said, but by the material that constitutes the 
object.
(14) Here ‘nature’ refers to the receptacle, space, and what Aristotle in Met. VII 
3 would argue matter as pure potentiality is.
(15) Timaeus, 50b5–c4, my emphasis. ὁ αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς τὰ πάντα 
δεχομένης σώματα φύσεως· ταὐτὸν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ προσρητέον· ἐκ γὰρ τῆςὰ ἑαυτῆς 
τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἐξίσταται δυνάμεως· δέχεται τε γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰ πάντα, καὶ μορφὴν 
οὐδεμίαν ποτὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν εἰσιόντων ὁμοίαν εἴληφεν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς·…
φαίνεται δὲ δι’ ἐκεῖνα ἄλλοτε ἀλλοῖον.
(16) Fleshing out this distinction on behalf of Plato would take us outside the 
scope of this chapter.
(17) The function that gold plays in Plato’s and Gregory’s accounts is that 
Aristotle’s essence.
(18) There is another distinctive feature of Gregory’s metaphysics that might be 
helpful to mention here: Gregory has no matter in his system; he uses the 
example of a quantity of matter like gold to illustrate his view, presumably 
because it is a more intuitive, easier to grasp way to present the point he wants 
to make, especially given the intended readership of the Letter to Ablabius. I 
offer an analysis of Gregory’s views on matter, including a discussion of the 
recent literature, in ‘Gregory of Nyssa on the Creation of the World’, in 
Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity, ed. A. Marmodoro and B. Prince 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 94–111.
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(19) For Aristotle (but not for Gregory) both individuation principles are sortal 
principles, carrying count principles with them. I cannot investigate here the 
relation between the two principles within Aristotle’s metaphysics.
(20) Ad Ablabium, 40.24–41.2 (PG 120): ὁ μὲν τῶν ὑποστάσεων λόγος διὰ τὰς 
ἐνθεωρουμένας ἰδιότητας ἑκάστῳ τὸν διαμερισμὸν ἐπιδέχεται καὶ κατὰ 
σύνθεσιν ἐν ἀριθμῷ θεωρεῖται·.
(21) The expression ‘presented to us’ indicates that their multitude is something 
of an appearance, or, more carefully said, not as real as their nature. There is an 
echo here of Plato’s claim that we should not call ‘“triangle” or any of the other 
shapes which come to be in the gold, as though it is these [i.e. as though they 
had existence], because they change even while you’re making the 
statement’ (50b2–4).
(22) Gregory grasps perfectly the distinction between the two uses of the verb to 
be, for essential predication and identity respectively; passages like the 
following one make it clear: ‘Luke is a man, or Stephen is a man; but it does not 
follow that if any one is a man he is therefore Luke or Stephen’ (Ad Ablabium, 
40.21–3 (PG 120)).
(23) Furthermore, for Gregory, the nature of each thing is not peculiar to that 
individual thing; rather, it is peculiar to each kind of thing, e.g. the nature of gold 
characterizes golden coins or the nature of man men. Gregory writes: ‘their [the 
people’s] nature is one…not divided with the individuals who participate in 
it’ (ibid. 41.2–7 (PG 120)).
(24) Ibid. 54.1–4 (PG 132): ὥσπερ τοίνυν πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ χρύσεοι στατῆρες, χρυσὸς 
δὲ εἷς, οὕτω καὶ πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου 
δεικνύμενοι, οἷον Πέτρος καὶ Ἰάκωβος καὶ Ἰωάννης, εἷς δὲ ἐν τούτοις ὁ 
ἄνθρωπος. Gregory must have believed in eternal species, like Aristotle, even if 
for different, theological reasons.
(25) Ibid. 40.17–21 (PG 120): πολλοὺς μὲν εἶναι τοὺς μετεσχηκότας τῆς φύσεως, 
φέρε εἰπεῖν μαθητὰς ἢ ἀποστόλους ἢ μάρτυρας, ἕνα δὲ ἐν πᾶσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, 
εἴπερ, καθὼς εἴρηται, οὐχὶ τοῦ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς φύσεώς ἐστιν 
ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
(26) In giving this reading of the text, I disagree with the mainstream scholarly 
view according to which Gregory would be claiming that all men (and therefore 
by extension the Persons of the Trinity) are instances of the same universal 
property. See e.g. C. Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the 
Knowledge of God: In your Light We Shall See Light (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 307: ‘The relationship between an ousia and a hypostasis is thus 
the same as that between a form (or species, εἷδος) and an individual thing that 
represents that form (ἄτομον). For two or more things to be consubstantial with 
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one another, then, means that they are instances of the same common nature.’ 
Also, R. Cross, ‘Two Models of the Trinity?’, The Heythrop Journal 43.3 (2002): 
280: ‘The Eastern view—that the divine essence is a shared universal—can be 
found clearly and unequivocally in Gregory of Nyssa…He claims that the divine 
essence is, in this respect at least, the same as any created essence…As Gregory 
understands such universals, they are numerically singular.’ My reply to this line 
of interpretation is that if the Persons of the Trinity were instances of a universal 
property, being God, the God that is one would be an abstract entity and 
something of different ontological status from the Persons, which as we have 
seen is against the doctrine. God cannot be a form, a universal, a transcendent 
idea, or a concept that is instantiated in concrete individual Gods or Persons. 
Different but also leaning on a type/token distinction is M. Barnes’s 
interpretation, according to which Gregory’s argument is that: ‘if it can be 
shown that each Person performs the same activities and the activity of the 
Godhead is one, then the divine nature is one’ (Power of God, 298). The 
reasoning here is very condensed. Briefly filling it in, Barnes’s idea is that for 
Gregory if the divine activity is one, and so the divine nature is unified, as it is 
instantiated in the three Persons, then there is one God in the Trinity. Along a 
similar line, L. Ayres (Nicaea, 357–8, emphasis in the original): ‘Gregory, of 
course, does not want to deny that the divine persons possess their own distinct 
and irreducible hypostatic existence. However, he uses a model of causality to 
present the three not as possessing distinct actions, but as together constituting 
just one distinct action (because they are one power).’ The problem is that on 
this reading none of the Persons of the Trinity would be God, if they instantiate 
the undivided divine nature jointly. (It is similar to a human hand, which jointly 
with the body constitute a human being; this makes the hand human, but not a 
human being.) As we saw, Gregory sets out in the letter to address the 
metaphysical challenge that each of the Persons is God, not just divine, and still, 
there is only one God. So Gregory wouldn’t want his argument to lead to the 
conclusion that follows from Ayres’ and Barnes’ position.
(27) Ad Ablabium, 41.2–4 (PG 120): ἡ δὲ φύσις μία ἐστίν […] οὐκ αὐξανομένη διὰ 
προσθήκης, οὐ μειουμένη δι᾽ ὑφαιρέσεως.
(28) Ibid. 53.7–14 (PG 131–2): οὔτε μειώσεως οὔτε αὐξήσεως κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ 
λόγον προσγινομένης τῇ φύσει, ὅταν ἐν πλείοσιν ἢ ἐλάττοσι θεωρῆται. μόνα γὰρ 
κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἀριθμεῖται, ὅσα κατ᾽ ἰδίαν περιγραφὴν θεωρεῖται· ἡ δὲ 
περιγραφὴ ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ σώματος καὶ μεγέθει καὶ τόπῳ καὶ τῇ διαφορᾷ τῇ κατὰ 
τὸ σχῆμα καὶ χρῶμα καταλαμβάνεται· τὸ δὲ ἔξω τούτων θεωρούμενον ἐκφεύγει 
τὴν διὰ τῶν τοιούτων περιγραφήν.
(29) Ibid. 54.1–4 (PG 132): ὥσπερ τοίνυν πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ χρύσεοι στατῆρες, χρυσὸς 
δὲ εἷς, οὕτω καὶ πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου 
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δεικνύμενοι, οἷον Πέτρος καὶ Ἰάκωβος καὶ Ἰωάννης, εἷς δὲ ἐν τούτοις ὁ 
ἄνθρωπος.
(30) This concluding comparison is particularly telling because it helps us 
understand a potentially misleading expression Gregory uses, namely, ‘the man 
in them’. Gregory does not mean the universal man in each man. His comparison 
is: ‘as then the golden staters are many, but the gold is one; […] [men] are many, 
yet the man in them is one’. What Gregory is saying is that the man in all the 
men is one. The translation in English does not make this explicit; one may still 
think that ‘the man in them’ is the man in each of them. That this is not what 
Gregory is saying is explicit in the Greek text: εἷς δὲ ἐν τούτοις ὁ ἄνθρωπος; the 
man who is in them is one.
(31) Ibid. 40.17–21 (PG 120): πολλοὺς μὲν εἶναι τοὺς μετεσχηκότας τῆς φύσεως, 
φέρε εἰπεῖν μαθητὰς ἢ ἀποστόλους ἢ μάρτυρας, ἕνα δὲ ἐν πᾶσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, 
εἴπερ, καθὼς εἴρηται, οὐχὶ τοῦ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς φύσεώς ἐστιν 
ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
(32) Ibid. 41.2–7 (PG 120): ἡ δὲ φύσις μία ἐστίν, αὐτὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡνωμένη καὶ 
ἀδιάτμητος ἀκριβῶς μονάς…ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἓν οὖσα καὶ ἓν διαμένουσα κἂν ἐν 
πλήθει φαίνηται, ἄσχιστος καὶ συνεχὴς καὶ ὁλόκληρος καὶ τοῖς μετέχουσιν 
αὐτῆς τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον οὐ συνδιαιρουμένη.
(33) One might speculate that Gregory is influenced in thinking of the nature of 
things of a kind as the fusion of the totality of things of that kind by an 
ontological position which is attributed to the philosopher Hippias, in Plato’s 
dialogue Hippias Major, and which appears to be one of fusions of things of the 
same kind:
Socrates, you don’t look at the entireties of things (ta hola tôn pragmatôn), 
nor do the people you’re used to talking with. You people knock away at 
the fine (kalon) and the other beings (onta) by taking each separately and 
cutting it up with words [like Gregory’s articulation of man into ‘disciples 
[…] apostles, martyrs’.] Because of that you don’t realise how great 
(megala) they are—naturally continuous bodies of being (dianekê sômata 
tês ousias). (301b2–7, my emphasis)
I cannot explore this thought further in this context.
(34) Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960), 90.
(35) We may conjecture that Gregory may be thinking of the fusion of the human 
condition in nature as the fusion of rationality in nature, which, since Aristotle, 
had been the differentia that defined the essence of man.
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(36) Ad Ablabium, 42.5–9 (PG 120): κύριος ὁ θεός σου κύριος εἷς ἐστι, κἂν ἡ 
φωνὴ τῆς θεότητος διήκη διὰ τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος. ταῦτα δὲ λέγω κατὰ τὸν 
ἀποδοθέντα ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως λόγον, ἐν ᾧ μεμαθήκαμεν μὴ δεῖν 
πληθυντικῷ χαρακτῆρι τὴν προσηγορίαν πλατύνειν τῆς φύσεως.
(37) Ibid. 54.24–55.3 (PG 132): τὴν δὲ θεὸς φωνὴν παρατετηρημένως κατὰ τὸν 
ἑνικὸν ἐξαγγέλλει τύπον, τοῦτο προμηθουμένη, τὸ μὴ διαφόρους φύσεις ἐπὶ τῆς 
θείας οὐσίας ἐν τῇ πληθυντικῇ σημασίᾳ τῶν θεῶν παρεισάγεσθαι.
(38) Ibid. 56.3–10 (PG 133): τὸ μὲν αἴτιον […] εἶναι τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αἰτίου· καὶ τοῦ 
ἐξ αἰτίας ὄντος πάλιν ἄλλην διαφορὰν ἐννοοῦμεν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ προσεχῶς ἐκ τοῦ 
πρώτου, τὸ δὲ διὰ τοῦ προσεχῶς ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου, ὥστε καὶ τὸ μονογενὲς 
ἀναμφίβολον ἐπὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ μένειν, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς εἶναι τὸ πνεῦμα μὴ 
ἀμφιβάλλειν, τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ μεσιτείας καὶ αὐτῷ τὸ μονογενὲς φυλαττούσης καὶ τὸ 
πνεῦμα τῆς φυσικῆς πρὸς τὸν πατέρα σχέσεως μὴ ἀπειργούσης.
(39) Ibid. 57.8–12 (PG 135–6): Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν τὰς μὲν ὑποστάσεις ἐπὶ τῆς ἁγίας 
τριάδος ὁ τοῦ αἰτίου διακρίνει λόγος…ἡ δὲ θεία φύσις ἀπαράλλακτός τε καὶ 
ἀδιαίρετος διὰ πάσης ἐννοίας καταλαμβάνεται, διὰ τοῦτο κυρίως μία θεότης 
καὶ εἷς θεὸς καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα τῶν θεοπρεπῶν ὀνομάτων μοναδικῶς 
ἐξαγγέλλεται.
(40) Ibid. 47.24–48.2 (PG 125): πᾶσα ἐνέργεια ἡ θεόθεν ἐπὶ τὴν κτίσιν 
διήκουσα…ἐκ πατρὸς ἀφορμᾶται καὶ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ πρόεισι καὶ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ 
ἁγίῳ τελειοῦται.
(41) Ibid. 50.15–17 (PG 128): ἀφορμάω, ἐνεργέω, and τελειόω respectively: ἐκ 
μὲν τοῦ πατρὸς οἷον ἐκ πηγῆς τινος ἀφορμώμενος, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ 
ἐνεργούμενος, ἐν δὲ τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ πνεύματος τελειῶν τὴν χάριν.
(42) See Radde-Gallwitz’s chapter in this volume, which offers a more detailed 
account of the three Persons’ (in his words) ‘distinct and non-interchangeable 
roles’:
Although the three persons are not distinct agents (insofar as distinct 
agents have distinct acts), they can nonetheless be said to have distinct 
and non-interchangeable parts within each single act. This distinction is 
already signalled by Gregory’s typical use of the customary prepositional 
markers for the three: from, through, and in. The point is not that there are 
three roles played by three agents, but that each act is performed by (or 
‘in’) the Spirit and has an explanation involving the Father and the Son. We 
can see this by examining Gregory’s reading of the language of 
‘performing all in all’ in 1 Corinthians 12:4–11. Gregory assumes that the 
subject of the verb energei here is the Spirit. (p. 213, this volume)
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(43) Ad Ablabium, 48.4–8 (PG 125): οὐκ ἀποτεταγμένη ἑκάστου καὶ ἰδιάζουσά 
ἐστιν ἡ περί τι σπουδή· ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἂν γίνηται τῶν εἴτε εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν 
πρόνοιαν φθανόντων εἴτε πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οἰκονομίαν καὶ σύστασιν, διὰ 
τῶν τριῶν μὲν γίνεται, οὐ μὴν τρία ἐστὶ τὰ γινόμενα.
Some scholars have argued that the interdependence of the three Persons’ roles 
is what justifies God’s oneness in number. In his contribution to this volume, 
Radde-Gallwitz argues that for Gregory God is one and three on account of the 
fact that His action is (numerically) one, but composite, having three parts that 
are correlated with the Persons of the Trinity:
As in Against Eunomius 2, Gregory is interested first of all in the 
achievement of a divine activity and then secondly in what we can infer 
from any such case. As in Against Eunomius 2, the conditions lying behind 
any single divine action are the power to perform it and the intention to do 
so—now correlated with Son and Father, respectively, following in reverse 
the order of the baptismal formula. That Gregory makes this Trinitarian 
correlation means that, for him, what it is to say Father is in part to speak 
of this origination of divine action, what it is to speak of Son is in part to 
refer to the divine power, and what it is to name Spirit is in part to talk 
about God’s acting ad extra. (p. 213, this volume)
We encounter here the same problem we found with Barnes’s interpretation. If 
each of the Persons of the Trinity possesses only one component of the divine 
nature, whereas all three together make up the whole of the divine nature, then 
how can Gregory explain that each Person of the Trinity is God? As Gregory 
states, ‘not to acknowledge the Godhead of the Son and the Holy Spirit, […] is 
impious and absurd’ (Ad Ablabium, 38.5–7 (PG 116–17)), hence each of the 
Persons is God, as we saw.
